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ABSTRACT: Through a careful reading of Foucault’s 1979 lectures on neoliberalism along-
side Volumes 1 and 2 The History of Sexuality, I argue that scholarship on both neoliberalism 
and queer theory should heed Foucault’s framing of both neoliberalism and sexuality as 
central to biopolitics.  I thus offer two correctives to these fields of scholarship: for scholar-
ship on neoliberalism, I locate a way to address the ethical bankruptcy of neoliberalism in a 
manner that Marxist analyses fail to provide; for scholarship in queer theory, I warn that 
the longstanding embrace of non-conformity as a mode of resistance to normalization is 
suspiciously neoliberal.  I conclude with the possibility of rehabilitating the concept of jouis-
sance as a non-fungible limit to the enterprising rationality of neoliberalism that, if histori-
cized and especially racialized, might offer a meaningful response to the increasing ethical 
collapse wrought by the neoliberalization of our lives. 
 
Keywords: Neoliberalism, queer theory, sexuality, ethics, fungibility, queer of color cri-
tique, anti-social turn. 
 
The 2011 emergence of Occupy events across the world crystallized the widespread drive to 
challenge the political and economic hegemony of neoliberalism, broadly construed.  In 
light of the reports that queers jumped into the fray from the very beginning, I frame this 
essay on Foucault with this contemporary question: what relation does the Occupy move-
ment have to queer politics?  Beyond the superficial alliances that might form between 
various disenfranchised groups, is there something about queer expressions of gender and 
sexuality that challenges the present economic systems of neoliberalism in particularly 
crucial and important ways?  And, conversely, can we claim to challenge these present 
economic systems without attending to the kinds of questions posed by queer politics? 
In 1978-79, two years after the publication of Volume One of The History of Sexuality, 
Foucault dedicated his Collège de France lectures to neoliberalism.   Entitled Naissance de la 
Biopolitique (in English, The Birth of Biopolitcs), Foucault explicitly locates the conceptual 
shifts in economic theories and practices in the same place he had located sexuality—name-
ly, at the center of biopolitics.  To indulge some uncomfortably organic metaphors, if sex-
uality is the heart and lifeblood of biopolitics, neoliberalism is its birth-mother.  In this pa-
per, I draw out some of the insights we gain by reading Foucault’s work on sexuality along-
side these lectures on economics.  My interest is not in tracing the development of these 
themes in or across Foucault’s writings, although this is clearly an important and promising 
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project,1 but rather in what Foucault’s writings can tell us about our current times, steeped 
as we are in the normalizing regimes of both sexuality and neoliberalism.   
Neoliberalism is arguably one of the most frequently circulating terms in current 
academic and non-academic political conversations.  Accordingly, it invokes a remarkably 
elastic set of meanings that run the gamut of political fealties: it can refer, for its advocates, to 
the enlightened state of a free market that is the essence of democracy or, for its critics, to the 
evils of the economic doctrines of globalization, particularly as linked to the IMF and World 
Bank.2  Within this latter critical appraisal, which is thankfully proliferating, most scholarship 
works to expose some part of the vast array of ethical and political problems that neo-
liberalism has created in the last three decades (using the historical benchmarks of Thatcher-
ism and Reagonomics to track its ascent).  The list of topics can be dizzying: structural, gross 
disparities in wealth and poverty, globally and locally; long-term resource depletion and 
environmental destruction; human rights violations in and around the work-place; the per-
sistent economics of racism and the dismantling of public education; and so on.   
Led particularly by astute work by feminist and critical race theorists, this scholar-
ship is calling out one of the central ethical dilemmas of our neoliberal times—namely, the 
structured production of gendered and racialized poverty, along with horrific human rights 
violations, by the widespread embrace of neoliberalism’s economic mantras of deregulation 
and privatization.  Early neoliberal theorists, most famously perhaps Milton Friedman, ar-
gued that a truly free market and the triumph of pure entrepreneurial opportunity would 
ultimately erase any such structural poverty.3  For overdeveloped countries that have em-
braced these neoliberal practices and principles, the exposure of these structured socio-
economic disparities presents an aporia—a true failure of neoliberal modes of reflection to 
address, much less solve, the fundamental violence against human lives exposed by the 
scholarship.  These examples of structural violence are, rather, viewed in exactly the man-
ner that early neoliberal theorists conceptualized such problems—namely, as merely con-
temporary misfortunes that the long-term work of the free market will eventually solve. 
By naming this failure to admit the structural deleterious effects of neoliberal prac-
tices, principles and cultures as specifically ethical, I argue that it indicates a fundamental 
erasure of valuing human life by any measure other than the interest-maximizing barome-
                                                 
1 See Andrew Dilts, “From ‘Entrepreneur of the Self’ to ‘Care of the Self’: Neo-Liberal Governmentality 
and Foucault’s Ethics.” Foucault Studies, no. 12, (2011), 130-146. I will return to Dilts’ provocative work 
later in the essay. 
2 Prime examples of the advocacy work include Francis Fukiyama, The End of History and the Last Man 
(New York: Free Press, 1992) and Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New 
York: Penguin, 2005).  Prime examples of the critical work include Wendy Brown, Edgework: Critical Es-
says on Knowledge and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Jurgen Habermas, “Toward a 
Cosmopolitan Europe,” Journal of Democracy vol. 14, no. 4 (2003), 86-100; David Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neo-
liberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2009); Jodi 
Dean, “Drive as the Structure of Biopolitics: Economy, Sovereignty, and Capture” Krisis: A Journal for 
Contemporary Philosophy vol. 2 (2010) 2-15; and Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2003).  For an excellent recent overview of various “forms” of neoliberalism, see Loic Wac-
quant, “Three steps to a historical anthropology of actually existing neoliberalism,” Social Anthropology 
vol. 20 (2012), 66-79.   Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for bringing this last essay to my attention. 
3 See, for example, his classic Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962). 
Foucault Studies, No. 14, pp. 79-97. 
81 
 
ter of neoliberalism; even more strongly, I argue that this erasure is integral to the neolibe-
ral valorization of market rationality and its duty to maximize one’s interests at all costs.  I 
call this out as a crisis in ethics to attempt to demarcate this elision of all values into market 
values—an elision that is not reducible to economic or political epiphenomenon.  I mark 
this as a problem of ethics to mark the collapse of all values, especially those that might 
govern our relationships to ourselves and others, into the neoliberal barometer of success. 
I thereby attempt to address a central lacuna at work in the majority of this scholar-
ship exposing these structural deleterious effects of neoliberalism.  Most often constrained 
by an implicitly Marxist framework, a great deal of the scholarship that exposes these struc-
tural and violent effects advances an ideological analysis that conceptualizes neoliberalism 
strictly within the confines of the economic and the political.4  Consequently, while it ex-
poses these ethical problems of structural deleterious effects, it fails to offer any resources 
for engaging them explicitly as ethical problems.  This essay is part of a much larger project 
attempting to address these lacunae. 
By situating my reading of Foucault in this context, I hope to show how his lectures 
on neoliberalism, especially when read alongside his ongoing work on sexuality and plea-
sure, offer signposts for crucial archaeological and genealogical work on the historically un-
precedented categories operating in neoliberal cultures, practices, and values.  The work of 
excavating these categories sharpens our focus on possible sites of intervention in this cur-
rent milieu of neoliberalism, which is simultaneously exacerbating ethical problems around 
the world and undermining our abilities to frame them explicitly as ethical problems.  With 
a focus on the kind of non-normative social rationality that Foucault locates in neoliberal 
theorists, I argue that fungibility becomes the primary barometer for all evaluative judg-
ments, including those regarding social difference.  I then conclude with a sketch of what 
this means for dominant trends in queer theory, especially the anti-social turn and queer of 
color critique. 
 
“Human Capital:” Neoliberalism’s Social Ontology 
Foucault insists that neoliberalism is not merely the latest ideological instantiation of capita-
lism.  Situating it in a longer historical context than that of most contemporary scholarship,5 
                                                 
4 For prime examples of this Marxist critique of neoliberalism, see Harvey; Lisa Duggan, The Twilight of 
Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003); Henry 
Giroux, Against the Terror of Neoliberalism: Politics Beyond the Age of Greed (Boulder: Paradigm Books, 2008) 
and David Theo Goldberg, The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009).  The explicitly non-Marxist analysis that I am deriving from Foucault here also addresses current 
trends in queer theory that analyze neoliberalism through Marxist lenses, including turns to the utopic as 
a queer temporal horizon.  See especially the recent issue of glq, “Queer Studies and the Crisis of Capi-
talism,” edited by Jordana Rosenberg and Amy Villarejo, vol. 18, no. 1 (2012); as well as Rosemary Hen-
nessey, Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism (New York and London: Routledge, 2000) 
and Kevin Floyd, The Reification of Desire: Towards a Queer Marxism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2009).  While I conclude this essay with a brief sketch of problematics related to the anti-social turn 
in queer theory, I offer a more thorough analysis of queer theory’s troubled relation with key concepts of 
neoliberalism in a chapter of my current book manuscript, The Biopolitics of Cool: Neoliberalism, Difference, 
Ethics. 
5 Most scholarship, such as that of Harvey, Giroux, Stiglitz and Duggan, locates the emergence of neo-
liberalism primarily in the Chicago School of the 1960’s.  See Aiwha Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Muta-
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ranging from 18th century French and British economists6 to German ordoliberals of the 
1930 to 1950’s and the U.S. Chicago School of the 1960s and 70s, he argues that neolibe-
ralism emerges out an intensification of the fundamental principle of classical liberalism: 
the separation of the Economy and State (a twin that is almost fully eclipsed by its much 
more infamous sibling, the separation of Church and State).  Foucault argues that liberalism 
enacts a profound shift in conceptions of governmental rationality, bringing a utilitarian 
rationality to bear on all practices of government and thereby transforming the very mea-
ning of “nature” to refer to the specific logic at work in governmental practices.  Liberalism 
thus displaces the older metaphysics of a transcendental nature that, whether divine or hu-
man, hovers over and hems in the realm of politics.  In liberalism, politics becomes the sin-
gular horizon of judgment and, within that singularity, the epistemological mechanisms of 
the economy become the practice of judgment: “success replaces legitimacy”7 as the criteria 
for governmental action.  For Foucault, this new form of governmental practice and rationa-
lity, born in liberalism, becomes the basis for grasping how neoliberalism works. 
To understand how neoliberalism intensifies and transforms this new rationality, 
Foucault focuses on the mechanism that causes this crucial shift in the relations between 
politics and economics enacted in liberalism—namely, the market.8  He argues that, displa-
cing the role of the law as a juridical structure to limit the power of the state, the market 
becomes a site of veridiction that, in turn, saturates the field of the political, writ large—that 
is, the market saturates the political per se.  It emerges—as both a concept and a practice9—as a 
site of “truth” that governmental practices need to leave alone.  “Laissez-nous faire” becomes 
the logic of this market rationality that, in the mid-eighteenth century, emerges as a coun-
ter-point to the juridical rationality of the government.  The relation between economics 
and politics is subsequently flipped: no longer is it the government’s duty to rein in the 
market to ensure “fair” prices; rather, “to be good government, government has to function 
according to truth”10—and it is the market that is the site of veridiction.  “[T]he market 
must tell the truth (dire le vrai)”11—and thereby shape, enliven and regulate exactly what it 
means to live “in the truth” (“dans le vrais”), as we and Mendel all must do.12 
                                                                                                                                                             
tions in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham and Loondon: Duke University Press, 2006), especially 10-12, 
for an overview of these genealogies of neoliberalism. 
6 Foucault cites the physiocrats of France, the English economists and even theorists like Mandeville; see 
Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics; Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, translated by Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 275.  Hereafter cited as BB. 
7 Foucault, BB, 16. 
8 In a further distancing from Marxist analysis, Foucault does not frame his discussion of the market in 
mid-18th century liberalism as the advent of capitalism. Resisting, as ever, the possibility of a singular 
cause of this emergence of a new kind of market rationality, Foucault suggests “a polygonal or poly-
hedral relationship” (BB, 33) between a number of economic, demographic, technical, theoretical, and go-
vernmental shifts to try to understand how it emerges.  For readers of Foucault, this approach comes as 
no surprise.   
9 Foucault discusses the transformation as both in practices, such as shifts in agriculture and so on, (33) 
and in “the heads of the economists,” (30) including Adam Smith explicitly later in the lectures. 
10 Foucault, BB, 32. 
11 Ibid. 
12 In one of his earliest discussions of “truth” as a matter of discursive practices, rather than correspond-
ence, Foucault argues that Mendel’s insights about genetics had to begin to shape contemporary dis-
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As neoliberalism then aims to enact a new social ontology and epistemology in the 
early and mid-twentieth century, Foucault argues, it does so by continuing, extending and 
intensifying this transformation already underway in liberalism, from juridical to performa-
tive principles of rationality as the mechanisms for evaluation.  In neoliberalism, the “free 
space of the market”—i.e., the eighteenth century liberal insistence that the government 
must not intervene in the processes of the economy—is taken up as a practice of rationality 
that can produce new kinds of subjectivities: it can produce a new social ontology.  The 
kinds of transformations Foucault charts in the neoliberals are subsequently not of econo-
mic policy, but of the extensions of this economic rationality into matters as intimate as the 
parent/child relation, as abstract as genetics, as political as education, and as socio-biolo-
gical as health care and public hygiene.13  These extensions and intensifications initiate a 
new social epistemology, wherein we find ourselves now fully in the throes of “not a mar-
ket society, but an enterprise society.”14  This is, after all, the neoliberal aim: to transform so-
ciety itself into a mode of enterprise, of entrepreneurial and productive activities, of crea-
tive and competitive subjects.15  
With appropriate irony, Foucault locates the foothold for this neoliberal epistemolo-
gical transformation in the very thing that Marxist analysis claims as its own—labor.   
Foucault argues that “the essential epistemological transformation of these neo-liberal ana-
lyses is their claim to change what constituted in fact the object, or domain of objects, the 
general field of reference of economic analysis.”16  No longer focused on the analysis of me-
chanisms of production, exchange or consumption, neoliberal economic analysis takes up a 
new kind of object—the activity of labor.  And as the object of analysis changes, the opera-
tive mode of rationality also shifts.  The question of economics shifts not only from pro-
cesses to activities, but concurrently from structural questions about “what choices are 
made” to individuating and subjectivating questions of “why did you choose this?” and, 
ultimately, “who are you?”  The anchor of this activity is not labor as an abstracted cate-
gory, but the point of view of the person who works: “we will have to study work as econo-
mic conduct practiced, implemented, rationalized, and calculated by the person who 
works.  What does working mean for the person who works?  What system of choice and 
rationality does the activity of work conform to?”17  In this transformation from “the hu-
man” into “human capital,” Foucault focuses on how this new social epistemology of enter-
prise comes to produce new kinds of subjectivities—namely, what Foucault calls “subjects 
of interests.”18 
                                                                                                                                                             
courses before they could be fully “true.”  See “Discourse on Language” in The Archeology of Knowledge 
and the Discourse on Language, translated by Alan Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971). 
13 See Foucault, BB, 227-230. 
14 Foucault, BB, 147. 
15 It is important to remember that Foucault locates this kind of “anarchist, radical” neoliberalism that en-
acts this new social epistemology at the level of the individual in the Chicago School theorists of the U.S., 
not in the German ordoliberal model. 
16 Foucault, BB, 222. 
17 Ibid., 223. 
18 Foucault locates the emergence of this “subject of interests” in English empiricists such as John Locke 
and David Hume, thereby locating a split subjectivity at the heart of modern discourses of the Rights of 
Man.  See Lecture Eleven. 
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When the early neoliberal theorists19 approach the worker as “an entrepreneur of 
himself,”20 they frame the worker as an actor and producer of his own wealth: the worker 
becomes “human capital.”21  And with this category, neoliberals are off to the races: “they 
are led to study the way in which human capital is formed and accumulated, and this enab-
les them to apply economic analyses to completely new fields and domains.”22  Human ca-
pital becomes the barometer for all of life’s activities: reproduction, and the choice of part-
ners to be involved, becomes a matter of genetic calculation of future human capital; child-
rearing—”time spent, care given, as well as the parents’ education”23—become forms of 
investment in human capital; medical care, public health and hygiene, and even migration 
all become matters for careful calculation of “investments we have made at the level of man 
himself.”24  As neoliberalism takes root as a widespread cultural episteme, economic calcu-
lation becomes the mode of rationality for self-reflection and the barometer for individual 
success.    
Initially, this appears to be the same kind of process Foucault has traced in his 
previous genealogical work, wherein a complex set of mechanisms slowly coalesces to pro-
duce the concept of an identity with very particular contours of interiority.  Early queer 
theory in the United States virtually canonized the “acts-to-identities” readings of History of 
Sexuality, Volume One to argue that the category of sexuality took root as a normative cate-
gory of identity, which then came to be internalized into the questions of sexual orientation 
and, subsequently, provides a crucial linchpin for biopolitics of normalization.25  In roughly 
parallel ways, Foucault’s work on madness, delinquency and criminality also trace similar 
moves, wherein a typology of identities and individuals emerges to set alongside the older 
typology of acts and practices.26  In each of these fields, a different register is thereby enac-
ted, as I have already indicated, in which the questions of interiority and identity can gain 
traction, thereby laying the groundwork necessary for the ensuing judgments of norma-
tivity: “who are you?” emerges and then enables the damning, “are you normal?”  
While it may at first appear that a similar transformation is at work here in the dis-
courses of neoliberalism, the logic of enterprise functions differently from that of the con-
tract, which frames the liberal understanding of market transactions and, arguably, also 
lays at the root of the normative judgments at work in madness, criminality, and sexuality.   
As the long tradition of contract theory shows, the stakes of the contract are explicitly ethi-
                                                 
19 He draws extensively on Chicago School theorists for these developments, especially Gary Becker and 
Theodore W. Schultz.   
20 Foucault, BB, 226. 
21 Ibid., 227. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 229. 
24 Ibid., 231.  It is worth noting that Foucault links the transformation—namely, “a policy of growth fo-
cused precisely on ...he form of investment in human capital” (232)—directly to the considerable eco-
nomic growth of Western and Japanese societies since 1930.  (232) 
25 See Lynne Huffer, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory (New York: Columbia, 
2010), for an incisive argument that this dominant reading turns on both a problematic translation of 
Foucault’s French into English and a distinctively Anglo-American concept of identity.  See also Jordan’s 
essay in this collection for warnings against the earnest, political readings that have dominated the 
Anglo-American reception of History of Sexuality, Volume One. 
26 See Foucault, BB, 248, for a reference to this shift from his previous work. 
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cal: the contract delineates clear terms of agreement that each party promises to fulfill, 
thereby constituting one’s duty.  Of course, as Kantian ethics (and especially Lacanian rea-
dings of them27) teach us, it is impossible to discern between motivations that are ethically 
aligned with duty and those that merely conform to duty: this is a lasting aporia of modern 
ethics.  But the tension that grabs Foucault’s attention in his readings of the emergence of 
political economy in 18th century theorists of liberalism is the uneasy relation that emerges 
between this kind of contractual duty, with its ethical barometer of right/wrong, and the 
rationality of the market, which functions purely through the efficient barometer of success/ 
failure.28  This tension maps onto the split subjectivity that Foucault locates at the heart of 
modern ontologies of liberalism—namely, the split between the contractually mitigated 
Rights of Man and the economically calculated “subject of interests.”  The former falls un-
der the rationality of normative judgment that governs the contract, while the latter is dri-
ven by the economic calculations that determine success/failure in the market: the former is 
ethical, the latter is efficient.    
Foucault argues, then, that the ontology of liberalism develops across the 18th cen-
tury into two major branches: the contract and the market.  Each of them functions accor-
ding to two different rationalities: the juridical and the efficient.  And each of them stakes 
two different social domains: the ethical and the economic.  The subjectivities attendant to 
these two branches of liberalism consequently also shift—from the interiority of the autono-
mous subject that purports to control his/her behavior to the socially scripted self that seeks 
to navigate the market’s vacillations and thereby maximize his/her interests.  Tracing this 
along Foucault’s various inquiries prior to the 1979 lectures, I suggest that the normative 
judgments at work in the discourses of madness, criminality, and sexuality follow out the 
logic of the contract and its subjectivity of interiority, which eventually becomes the norma-
lizing judgment of identity.  The practices and theories of neoliberalism then intensify and 
extend the other branch of liberalism’s ontology—namely, the logic of efficiency that con-
stitutes success/failure on the market and renders us “subjects of interest.”  
When the market begins to function as a site of veridiction, it becomes a kind of so-
cial ontology with the causal power to produce competitive, atomistic subjectivities with 
specifically demarcated sets of values, concerns and interests.  Foucault cites E. [Bonnot de] 
Condillac, writing in 1776, to explain how this regulation of prices in markets, rather than 
through transcendental concepts of a “just price,” functions only on the condition of the 
public character of the market: “prices can only be regulated in markets, because it is only 
there that the gathered citizens, by comparing their interests in exchanging, can judge the 
value of things relative to their needs...  it is only in markets that one can judge the relation-
ship of abundance and scarcity between things that determines their respective prices.”29 
The kind of rationality attendant to this particular form of subjectivity alters accordingly, 
setting an economic calculation of success/failure into motion as the primary horizon upon 
which value must be determined.  Other forms of judgment, especially juridical appeals to 
                                                 
27 See Alenka Zupancic, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan (London: Verso, 2000) for a provocative explication 
of this Kantian dilemma as the ethical dimension of the Lacanian Real. 
28 As the practices of political economy take root, Foucault writes, “Success or failure, then, will replace 
the division between legitimacy and illegitimacy,” (16) as the barometer by which to judge “good” go-
vernmental practices—and, by intensification and extension in neoliberalism, “good” human lives. 
29 Foucault, BB, 48, note 6. 
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transcendental principles such as those we find in contractual logic, are displaced as pos-
sible modes of evaluative discernment: only the calculation of private interest, which is the 
final barometer of acceptable profit/loss, becomes the acceptable mode of evaluation.  Still 
dependent on the liberal concept of a public/private split, the public domain shifts from the 
regulatory mechanism of the contract to the ateleological mechanism of the market: the 
market, not the contract, becomes the site of veridiction.    
Foucault locates the emergence of these new material and rational regulatory prin-
ciples in the development of liberalism.  However, neoliberalism intensifies the political, 
economic and epistemological shifts and schisms into new forms of social rationality and, 
eventually, a social ontology.  As the new social ontology of neoliberalism emerges along-
side the older one of liberalism, the framework of the rights-bearing citizen invested in 
ethical contracts of ownership no longer captures the socio-psychic dynamics of subjectivity 
enacted in neoliberalism.  The market logic of 18th century political economy intensifies in 
neoliberalism into a rationality of enterprise, which eclipses the contractual logic of libera-
lism almost entirely, and we become entrepreneurs extraordinaire, intensifying our inte-
rests in and through enterprises of any and all stripes.  Consequently, as the neoliberal on-
tology of human capital takes root through this social rationality of enterprise, questions of 
identity slide into the question of success.  Unlike the other discursive fields that Foucault 
has investigated, the demarcation at work in neoliberalism is not that of normativity/non-
normativity: neoliberalism operates through the social rationality of success, not identity.   
One cannot ask whether one is a neoliberal in the same way that one can ask whether one is a 
pervert or a criminal or a madman.  Once the principles of neoliberalism are absorbed into 
a culture, as they increasingly are in the U.S., we are all succumbing to the social rationality 
of neoliberalism: despite ideological or political differences, we are all speaking the same 
language, drinking the same Kool-Aid, breathing the same air.30  Consequently, the ques-
tion of identity, which involves laying claim to a substance, is turned inside out, becoming 
a matter of process that is absorbed into this neoliberal grammar of success.  One does not 
ask “who are you?” in neoliberalism.  Rather, one asks, “how good are you at what you do?  
How successful are you?” And the true bottom line: “how much and how well do you maximize 
your interests?” 
For Andrew Dilts, this move away from identities rooted in an anthropological in-
teriority—or what he calls “sovereign subjectivity”—becomes the promising (or at least in-
                                                 
30 The primary target of my rhetorical flourishes here is the lack of any substantial difference on these is-
sues in the U.S. mainstream political parties, but the language of “absorption” is dangerous (and I thank 
Mary Thomas for pushing me on this point).  I do not mean to imply that all persons in the U.S. or glo-
bally are participating in this social rationality of neoliberalism in the same way.  To the contrary, I am 
trying to bring into focus precisely the ethical problem of how neoliberalism is producing racialized and 
gendered disparities of historically unforeseen proportions in wealth, poverty, incarceration rates, edu-
cational funding, labor and human rights violations, human trafficking, and so on.  Despite one’s place-
ment in this spectrum of effects, however, the neoliberal market rationality seems increasingly to be the 
primary, if not only, recourse for reflection and meaningful discourse.  Further elaboration on how this 
emergent discourse of neoliberalism interacts with the longer standing contractual authority of libe-
ralism, particularly in specific socio-economic sites, outstrips this essay, but the ongoing work on penality 
and incarceration shores up precisely this differential.  For a very recent example, see Wacquant, “Three 
steps to a historical anthropology of actually existing neoliberalism.”   
Foucault Studies, No. 14, pp. 79-97. 
87 
 
triguing) move in neoliberalism that Foucault then tries to accentuate in his remaining work 
on ancient aesthetics of existence and care of the self.   I am sympathetic to and intrigued by 
Dilts’ project, but want to emphasize that the transition towards a non-normative ratio-
nality that precipitates this subject of interests in the neoliberals serves as a crucial link to 
trends in contemporary queer theory.  The ultimate question concerning Foucault’s work in 
History of Sexuality, Volume One, one which we all too often seem to forget until our students 
remind us, is how does this “sexual mosaic” of historical discourses on sexuality come to 
produce a deep, psychological, (auto)biographical interiority that we then understand as a 
substance to which a sociological identity adheres?  How do these discourses create this 
effect of interiority?   
Of course, the answer that carried the day for some time in queer theory derives 
from Judith Butler’s work in Gender Trouble—namely, through performative repetition. 
Among a variety of sources, however, Butler centrally relies on an Althusserian logic of 
interpellation, which in turn hinges on the existence of a social authority, whether abstract 
or ritualized, that can enforce the normative rationality at work in the normalizing dis-
courses.31  While this seems to be a viable answer for discourses of sexuality (and gender), 
the social practices of neoliberalism no longer fully operate through such Althusserian me-
chanics of interpellation (yet another reason that Foucault so assiduously takes his distance 
from Marxist analyses of neoliberalism).  Extrapolating from Jodi Dean’s work, I argue that 
the neoliberal intensification of enterprise and subsequent eclipse of liberalism’s contractual 
logic means that the social practices of neoliberalism do not operate through any of the 
three constitutive parts of interpellation: normative rationality recedes, as I have outlined 
already; psychological interiority fades as the operative mode of conceptualizing the self, as 
I will elaborate further in the final section of this paper; and social authority, in Lacanian 
terms, erodes as the Symbolic function declines. 
Drawing on Zizek and his use of Lacan, Dean argues that neoliberalism effects “the 
decline of symbolic efficiency,”32 which in turn renders us trapped at the level of the Ima-
ginary, where aesthetics displace ethics as the final arbiter of value.  We no longer have any 
clear models of authority: whether a progress report from the school or a medical diagnosis 
from the doctor or a piece of advice from the cleric, we immediately seek second, third, 
even fourth opinions (most often via the web) and thereby extend our ambivalence about 
the very possibility of certainty.  Stripping modern epistemologies of their barometers of 
certitude, this crisis in symbolic force fragments and multiplies both subjectivities and ra-
tionalities: identities no longer function with clear and distinct boundaries, roles, meanings 
                                                 
31 See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1989). 
Butler’s argument is richer than I can elaborate here, but the Althusserian roots come through not only in 
the infamous “hailing” of gender as the heteronormative cop, but also in her understanding of repetition, 
which very strongly echoes Althusser’s discussion of the socially binding character of rituals in “Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)” in Ben Brewster (trans.), Lenin and 
Philosophy and Other Essays, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971).  She accentuates this considerably 
in her emphasis on the performative character of such ritualized repetitions, but my point here is that the 
Althusserian roots nonetheless ground her analysis in a conceptual framework with limited resources for 
resisting neoliberal modes of social rationality, which fundamentally alter this repetitious character of 
social life. 
32 Dean, “Drive as the Structure of Biopolitics,” 61. 
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or purposes; and rationality becomes a mode for calculating endless self-enhancement and 
transformation.  The allegedly primary question about “the good life,” with its fusion of 
ethics, politics and aesthetics, is supplanted by the much more kinetic and purely aesthetic 
question about “the cool life.”   
Insofar as we are all, if in crucially materially different ways and degrees, coming to 
incorporate the social rationality of enterprise and its limitless calculation of intensifying 
interests, then we are doing so through practices that interpellation cannot map.  The mar-
ket may well be a site of veridiction, but it is a new kind of veridiction that is purely formal, 
with constantly shifting, transient, unpredictable, and innovative content.  Neoliberal prac-
tices embed us in a mode of rationality that cannot hail us with any normative force: as 
neoliberals, we cannot think ethics.  (Ironically, following Jodi Dean’s argument, this is pre-
cisely why “ethics centers” of every possible stripe—corporate, medical, legal, educatio-
nal—are proliferating: we need as many authorities as we can afford!) 
All of this is not to say, of course, that neoliberalism is not normalizing.  To the con-
trary, its normalizing power is precisely what I am trying to track.  But it is not normalizing 
along the vectors of identity formation that have thus far dominated Foucaultian readings 
of biopolitics.33  When we read Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism alongside his contem-
porary work on sexuality, for example, the normalizing vector of identity-formation that is 
diagnosed in Volume One of The History of Sexuality is exactly what is lacking in neo-
liberalism—and thus his claim that both neoliberalism and sexuality are the heart and life-
blood of biopolitics seems confusing.  However, when we read the lectures in the context of 
the shifts from Volume One to Volumes Two and Three of The History of Sexuality, we are 
re-oriented, just as Foucault was, away from questions of identity-formation and towards 
practices of the “self” that gauge, regulate, and steer themselves by and through the various 
exterior measures of myriad social practices.  While this externalizing of the self may be 
what Foucault finds promising and intriguing in neoliberalism,34 the erosion of ethics in 
neoliberal cultures that has occurred over the last two decades since Foucault’s lectures 
shows us that we must, as best we can, intercede in the pernicious biopolitics of neo-
liberalism.    
In an effort to find resources in Foucault for such a distancing from neoliberalism, I 
turn to a shared theme of all three volumes of History of Sexuality: pleasure.  What does Fou-
cault find to be ethical about the Ancient Greek practices of “pleasure” that might serve as 
warnings against the transformation of “pleasure” in neoliberalism?  And secondly, what 
might this tell us about queer theory’s embrace of “pleasure” as its distinguishing site of in-
vestigation? 
 
Neoliberals are not Ancient Greeks 
Despite their differences in orientation and analyses, Foucault remained concerned with the 
same area of social experience across all three volumes of his History of Sexuality: pleasure.   
Queer theorists have mined Volume One of History of Sexuality for strategies of resistance to 
                                                 
33 Or, as Ladelle McWhorter develops in her essay in this special edition, “normalization recedes [in neo-
liberalism] in favor of what Michel Foucault calls apparatuses of security and population management.”   
34 Again, for Dilts., this is Foucault’s turn towards non-sovereign practices as a promising horizon for a 
care of the self that may become an “ethics.”  
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heteronormativity, for better or for worse, through two kinds of readings: the transgression 
of norms and valorization of “the abnormal” or “queer;” and/or the “queering” of identity-
formation itself.  However, because neoliberalism functions as a normalizing technology of 
power without exerting a normative rationality, neither of these strategies is effective for re-
sisting neoliberalism; as we see all too easily in the commodification of “queer” in both po-
pular and academic culture, both strategies are easily subsumed into yet another opportu-
nity for the enterprising pursuit of maximizing one’s interests.  By turning to Foucault’s 
persistent concern with pleasure across all three volumes of History of Sexuality, I hope to 
excavate a dynamic in neoliberalism that offers some traction for resisting both its norma-
lizing grasp and its ethical bankruptcy. 
The themes of pleasure in Volume One of History of Sexuality are well known: the 
problematically orientalizing nostalgia for practices of ars erotica; the sharp analysis of scien-
tia sexualis as domesticating pleasure into an intellectual abstraction; and the infamously 
elusive suggestion that “the rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of 
sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures.”35  (Have any other three 
words ever received so much analysis, carried so much anxiety, or spurred so much specu-
lation?36)  For my purposes here, I merely note that Volume One argues that the deployment 
of sexuality is “one of the most important...  [of] concrete arrangements that would go to 
make up the great technology of power in the nineteenth century”37 precisely because it ma-
nages to domesticate pleasure.  It is through domesticating the unruly experiences of plea-
sure run amok, such as we find in the scenes of Jouy and his “inconsequential bucolic plea-
sures”38 or the grand “world of perversion ... [that] circulated through the pores of socie-
ty,”39 that biopolitics gains its foothold across the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
The deployment of “sexuality” across so many social domains—education, medicine, de-
mography, economics, household architecture, even the genre of “scandalous literature”—
renders us docile bodies precisely by de-fanging the wild excesses of pleasure, reducing 
one of the most obstreperous human experiences to the confines of sterile social utility.   
Without giving in to the ontology of repression that he so thoroughly debunks, when Fou-
cault reads the emergence of the normalizing techniques of sexuality as occurring in and 
through the regulating and abstracting of pleasure, he laments the shifts. 
It is telling, therefore, that as he turns in Volume Two to “the proper task of a history 
of thought…: to define the conditions in which human beings ‘problematize’ what they are, 
what they do, and the world in which they live,”40 Foucault remains fixated on this salient 
question of pleasure.  Rather than reading the ancient practices of pleasure back through 
                                                 
35 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1, translated by Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage, 1990), 157.  Hereafter cited as HS1. 
36 Much queer ink has been spilled on this provocation. For the most generative response, see Ladelle 
McWhorter’s Bodies and Pleasures. 
37 Foucault, HS1, 140. 
38 Ibid., 31. 
39 Ibid., 40.  Foucault’s elaboration of that world is irresistible: “children wise beyond their years, preco-
cious little girls, ambiguous schoolboys, dubious servants and educators, cruel or maniacal husbands, 
solitary collectors, ramblers with bizarre impulses.” (40) 
40 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume Two: The Use of Pleasure, translated by Robert Hurley 
(New York: Vintage, 1990), 10.   Hereafter cited as HS2. 
Winnubst: Neoliberal Pleasure 
90 
 
the epistemology of repression and its problematic of a pre-discursive nature or instinct, 
however, he takes up the various practices as they signify within various social, political, 
economic, and—most of all—ethical discourses.  He describes his project as the effort “to 
elicit, in its general features, the constitution of the aphrodisia as a domain of moral con-
cern,”41 taking up the use (chresis), mastery (enkrateia), and moderation (sophrosyne) of these 
practices of pleasure “to determine what structured the moral experience of sexual plea-
sures.”42  At the most general level, the anxiety enlivening all of these various domains of 
experience in ancient Greece is that which arguably also becomes the horizon of Foucault’s 
own thinking: the relation of freedom and truth.  The ethical problem of aphrodisia for the 
Greeks was the ongoing effort “[t]o be free in relation to pleasures [...] to be free of their 
authority;”43 to do so, one must cultivate a particular relation to truth that “constituted an 
essential element of moderation.”44 
Two sets of epistemologies and ontologies drive Foucualt’s analyses of these various 
interconnections: the Christian and the modern.  In the discussions of moderation as virile, 
rather than effeminate, and of truth as the instrumental applications of practical wisdom, 
rather than a deciphering of a law of interdiction, Foucault goes to great lengths to distance 
the ancient Greek practices of aphrodisia from Christian ontology and epistemology.  Simi-
larly, and particularly in the discussions of truth and its relation to self-knowledge, he also 
belabors the distance from any modern or Christian “hermeneutics of desire”45 into a con-
fessional, secretive self: the Greek relation to truth, he insists, “was not an epistemological 
condition enabling the individual to recognize himself in his singularity as a desiring sub-
ject and to purify himself of the desire that was thus brought to light.”46  The practices of 
pleasure intriguing Foucault in Volume Two are adamantly not involved in a truth of trans-
cendental principles or laws that then either prohibit or reveal an anthropological self re-
plete with singular interiority.  This emphatic distance from both Christian and modern on-
tologies constitutes, at least partially, the intrigue that these ancient practices hold for Fou-
cault. 
But these are not the concerns of neoliberalism.  As outlined above, the questions of 
transcendental laws and subjectivities of deep, interior desire are not active, enlivening dis-
courses in cultures of neoliberalism.  Mere “hang-overs” of previous historical ontologies 
(liberalism, perhaps Christianity47), they no longer cathect the enterprising subject of inte-
rests, as I will elaborate further in the following section.  While Foucault finds promising re-
sources for an ethics of living in the ancient Greek practices of pleasures and their enact-
ments of freedom and truth, the schema of pleasures’ relations to freedom and truth also 
shores up the contrast between those ancient practices and the ways that pleasures—and, 
subsequently, freedom and truth—are developed in neoliberalism.  Historically, the proble-
matics of Christian and modern ontologies do not exist for the practices of the ancient 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 37. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 79. 
44 Ibid., 89. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 The question of connections and disconnections between neoliberalism and Christianity far outstrip the 
parameters of this essay, but merit a great deal of inquiry. 
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Greeks.  For the neoliberal theorists that Foucault examines in the 1979 lectures, however, 
Christian and modern ontologies constitute the primary cultural horizon in which—and 
against which—neoliberals are theorizing.  It is almost as if, in much too gross historical 
strokes, we have two bookends standing outside the overlapping milieu of Christianity and 
modernity: ancient Greece and contemporary neoliberalism. The critical difference, of 
course, is that one comes much before modern Christianity and the other—the one in which 
we are currently living—springs out of it. 
While neoliberal practices of pleasure are thus immune to the principles of inter-
diction/transgression that cathect practices of pleasure, albeit differently, in the Christian 
and modern ontologies, these ontologies nonetheless provide the dominant epistemological 
frameworks available for discerning these neoliberal practices.  The warning we get from 
Volume Two, in this vein, is against this habitual recourse to models of desire/pleasure48 
that no longer apply: it is a warning against the historical anachronism of reading neo-
liberal practices through modern and Christian ontologies.  And, as we begin to understand 
more and more how neoliberalism functions as a social rationality, I emphasize that 
classical liberalism and Marxism are included in those modern ontologies. 
Using Foucault’s schema of the constitutive parts of “ethics,” we can discern more 
precisely how neoliberal practices of pleasure, freedom and truth not only diverge widely 
from those of the ancient Greeks that Foucault deems “ethical,” but more importantly—and 
disturbingly—how the practices of neoliberalism are ethically bankrupt.  They absorb all 
sets of values into the neoliberal market rationality of success, eroding our ability to govern 
our relations with ourselves and others by any other measure. 
As I have shown, one of the primary sites through which neoliberalism distances 
itself from practices and values of classical liberalism is what Foucault calls “the site of 
veridiction:” the enterprising market, not the juridical contract.  Consequently, in this mil-
ieu of neoliberalism, we reserve our true admiration for those who achieve economic 
success with the smallest effort or labor.  The great entrepreneurial innovation is great pre-
cisely because it grants success with minimal effort: “maximize interest, minimize labor.” 
This becomes the mantra of these neoliberal times.  Despite ongoing lip-service to the sac-
red cows of a Protestant Work Ethic and utility, we respond to their interpellation as a faint 
nostalgic call, heeding rather the kinetic circuit of interests, in whatever guise they may 
don: compulsive work-outs at the gym; latest hip trends of diet or fashion; quick new fixes 
for enhanced mental stimulation, whether organic, synthetic or virtual; and, of course, sav-
vy market transactions, no matter the object or market of exchange. 
Pleasure is subsequently the aspect of living that neoliberalism trumpets as its grand 
prize: maximizing our interests and minimizing our labor is quintessentially enjoyable.  To 
gloss Zizek, “Enjoy yourself!” is the symptom of our neoliberal age.  Far from the ancient 
Greek virtue of moderation, neoliberal pleasure must be constantly heightened, tweaked, 
and intensified by ever more finely tuned tools.  Unbounded pleasure is the distinguishing 
promise of neoliberalism, no longer something to be feared, avoided, moderated or domes-
ticated.  In previous ontologies of Christianity, liberalism and even Marxism, pleasures 
were conceptualized as tied to desire, which was driven by a lack.  In the social rationality 
                                                 
48 In this vein, Foucault’s shift from “sex/desire” in Volume One to “acts/pleasures/desires” in Volume Two 
can be seen as an enactment of this warning. Thanks to my co-editor for suggesting this. 
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of neoliberalism, these pleasures are unhinged from fulfilling any need or lack or desire: 
they are detached from any register of evaluation other than that of endless self-enhance-
ment.  In Lacanian terms that may be helpful here, these pleasures can be seen as the pure 
circuit of the drive, deriving enjoyment not from the act of eating, but from the repetitive 
stuffing of the mouth.49  Compulsive repetition, indifferent to the object, becomes the mea-
ning of “enjoyment” for the neoliberal subject, displacing any teleological story of a subject 
fulfilling a need.    
When neoliberalism takes root as a social ontology, this economic calculation of end-
less self-enhancement becomes the primary mode of self-reflection and, in Foucault’s terms 
of pleasures’ relation to freedom and truth, we begin to see the ethical bankruptcy of neo-
liberalism.  When the social rationality of neoliberalism transforms the subject into an end-
lessly self-enhancing circuit of interests, the notion of “freedom” is severed from any con-
cern with the other—much less, the Other—as a meaningful site of relationality.  Turned 
wholly towards the pleasure of maximizing one’s interests, the neoliberal subject only re-
gisters a concern with others who are “outside” of oneself insofar as they present oppor-
tunities or obstacles to that endless self-enhancement.  While this kind of socially cultivated 
and encouraged solipsism already endangers the possibility of ethics as a meaningful rela-
tion to others, a further look at the mechanisms of that economic calculation shows that the 
neoliberal self-enhancing enterprise of non teleological pleasures turns on the erasure of 
difference itself.  For post-Hegelian understandings of ethics, this erasure of difference en-
tails the erasure of the very possibility of ethics. 
The kind of calculation that Foucault locates in the neoliberal theorists is purely for-
mal.  That is, we neoliberal selves begin to determine all social values through the singular 
barometer of that economic calculation: fungibility.  To be fungible is to have all character 
and content hollowed-out.  It is a relationship of equity that requires purely formal sem-
blance.  In economic terms, fungibility refers to those goods and products on the market 
that are substitutable for one another.  For example, a bushel of wheat from Nebraska is 
fungible with a bushel of wheat from Iowa, assuming the quality and grade of wheat is the 
same.  Fungibility undergirds the monetary system, since it is the formal quality of bank 
notes that allows them to be fully substitutable: the $5 bill in my wallet is the same as the 
one in your wallet.  This is different from exchangeable goods, which must be related to a 
common standard (such as money) in order to judge their differing or similar values.50 
While this may all make sense at the level of economics, the problematic neoliberal 
twist is translating it from a dynamic of capital to a dynamic of “human capital:” this is the 
crucial site at which neoliberalism becomes ethically bankrupt.  As the extensive work on 
the globalized disparities of wealth and poverty shows, the fungibility of human capital is 
rendering human labor precarious.  Just as factory-workers in the Industrial Revolution 
were expendable, so too has a great deal of contemporary labor become formally inter-
changeable: assembling technological gadgets can happen here or there (or, in the veiled 
                                                 
49 See Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), 
167.  I am indebted to Jodi Dean’s suggestion of this concept for interpreting neoliberalism; see Dean, 
“Drive as the Structure of Biopolitics.” 
50 This central role of fungibility and not exchangeability in neoliberalism is one more reason to take our 
distance from Marxist analyses, with its focus on exchange, production and consumption. 
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nationalist language of the market, “here or offshore”); but increasingly, so can more highly 
specialized activities, such as medical diagnoses, engineering solutions, and even market 
analyses.  As the work of Aihwa Ong shows, the fungibility of human labor at all stratifi-
cations of socio-economic class—from factories in Malaysia and Indonesia to “cyber heroes” 
of Silicon Valley—is quickly rendering all human labor both migrant and precarious.51  
Even the human voice is on its way to fungibility, as the training of telemarketers in Mum-
bai to mimic the “flat accent” of the Midwestern American renders their human capital 
fully fungible with any other “unaccented” voice in the U.S.52   
This move towards fungibility, away from exchangeability, as the market’s baro-
meter transforms the category of social difference in significant and startling ways.  When 
the market outstrips the contract in neoliberalism, the truths produced by the market must 
be constantly and actively reproduced, over and over.  Foucault emphasizes that, in the dis-
tancing from both Adam Smith and Marx,53 neoliberals do not claim that competition is a 
natural human state; rather, it is constantly stimulated by the activity of the market as the 
site of veridiction.54  In order to achieve this constant stimulation of competition, the neo-
liberals (especially the ordoliberals in Germany) focus on “the formal properties of the com-
petitive structure that assured, and could assure, economic regulation through the price 
mechanism.”55  As McWhorter notes in her essay in this collection, Foucault specifies: “com-
petition is a principle of formalization.”56  Arguing explicitly against a welfare economy, the 
ordoliberals insisted that the fundamental objective of such policies to create and sustain 
the equalization of consumption across society was, actually, the death of economic growth.  
They argue that this crucial price mechanism, which generates the truths of the market, 
must “not [be] obtained through phenomena of equalization but through a game of dif-
ferentiations.”57  Inequality is essential to stimulating market competition and, as such, ex-
perienced by all members of the society.58  It is not that from which government ought to 
protect us.  To the contrary, if the neoliberal aim of rendering the market the site of veridic-
tion—across all aspects of society—is to be achieved, then inequality must be intensified 
and multiplied until the social fabric becomes a conglomeration of diffuse, fungible differ-
ences. 
Difference is thus not so much commodified, as bell hooks’ analysis from the 1990s 
argues; nor is it simply to be erased in the name of globalized homogeneity, as early critics 
of neoliberalism have argued.  Rather, difference must be intensified, multiplied and frac-
                                                 
51 See Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception. 
52 In our contemporary labor market, saturated as it is by these neoliberal principles, the aim increasingly 
seems to be to secure a non-fungible skill: to do so, however, is no mean trick, since one must carefully 
balance the heightened specialization of such a non-fungible skill and its marketability.  The market, after 
all, tells the truth—and it seems to prefer the fungibility of human capital over highly specialized skills. 
Enterprising innovation, of course, is the most valuable, as we see in the canonizing of Steve Jobs. 
53 See Foucault, BB, 130. 
54 See Foucault, BB, 118-121. 
55 Foucault, BB, 131. 
56 Ibid., 120. 
57 Ibid., 142. 
58 Hence the neoliberal mantras about privatization, not socialization, of protections against risk; such 
protection is up to individuals/units, not to society. If this market-enterprise society protects itself against 
risk, it kills its own vital principle of competition: socialism is suicide (143ff). 
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tured in the ongoing stimulation of competition: “The society regulated by reference to the 
market that the neoliberals are thinking about is a society in which the regulatory principle 
should not be so much the exchange of commodities as the mechanisms of competition.”59 
We are far beyond the politics of multiculturalism: diversity is the explicit aim of neo-
liberalism, as so many have argued (Duggan, Giroux).  But because it is following out the 
logic of fungibility that the market demands, these differences are purely formal—they 
must be hollow, stripped of any historical residues, especially if those residues bring with 
them the ethical and political conflict of xenophobia.    
 
Are Queer Pleasures Neoliberal? 
As the field of scholarship that distinguished itself, especially in its early years, as probing 
the social meanings and mappings of pleasure, queer theory’s historical emergence in the 
midst of neoliberalisms’s cultural ascent may be more than coincidence.  Given the proble-
matics of neoliberalism that I have derived from Foucault here, this valorizing of pleasure 
as the social site of transgression becomes rather suspect.  While the twists and turns of this 
field of scholarship over the last two decades do not acquiesce to any easy, general pattern, 
I conclude with speculations about how it intersects, overlaps and perhaps even coalesces 
with some of the more subtle, but nonetheless constitutive, dynamics of neoliberal practices 
and values.  Specifically, I sketch how the queer theorizing of pleasure known as “the anti-
social turn” may be one of neoliberalism’s best ruses and, subsequently, the turn to the 
racialized character of pleasure in scholarship known as “queer of color critique” is impera-
tive for any effort at resisting this clever alluring social rationality of neoliberalism. 
In the archaeology of neoliberalism’s dominant categories that I have developed 
here, the non-normative rationality that sets neoliberalism apart from other objects of Fou-
cault’s genealogies—madness, criminality, sexuality—turns out to be driven by the formal 
condition of fungibility.  That is, insofar as neoliberalism extends the economic calculation 
of enterprising, entrepreneurial interests into all domains of social, political, personal and 
even ethical life, it formalizes all objects of evaluation.  Whether racial difference, music 
genre, healthcare provisions, incarceration rates or sexual orientation, the only question for 
neoliberalism’s non-normative rationality is the quantifiable: how many fungible units are 
increased or decreased?  Lisa Duggan’s trenchant formulation of “homonormativity” thus 
becomes the problem of “homoneoliberalism.”60  That is, identity politics and histories be-
come fodder for the fungible machine of enterprise only on the condition that all sexual 
practices and pleasures are also formalized, shorn of historical and social differentiation.  
Rather than fall back on a Marxist ideological analysis, however, Foucault’s analysis allows 
us to sharpen the site of intervention: the formalizing of social relations and difference into 
fungible units.    
                                                 
59 Foucault, BB, 147. 
60 When Lisa Duggan initiates the language of “homonormativity” in her 1994 examination of neo-
liberalism, Twilight of Equality, she breaks the ground for what has become a sustained distancing from 
identity politics in queer theory.  However, as I noted above, Duggan grounds her analysis in a Marxist 
framework, as does the work of Kevin Floyd and the recent issue of glq on queer studies and neo-
liberalism. 
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Placing this intervention in Foucault’s overarching argument that neoliberalism 
emerges as an intensification of classical liberalism’s values, practices and categories, I em-
phasize that this formalizing process turns on an erasure of history.  That is, in the parti-
cular concepts of social difference that concern me most (racial, gender, sexuality—all of 
which occur differently), the neoliberal aestheticizing of difference can only occur through a 
flattening out of the intense histories of xenophobia and violence that attach to each of these 
categories in liberal cultures.  The tools of neoliberal cultures here are dizzying: contorted 
rhetorical strategies of amnesia and repression; selective historical narratives that feed feel-
good multiculturalism; savvy eye candy that markets and “celebrates” diversity; and so on.   
The histories of violence that attach to each of these categories of social difference must not 
circulate if the work of fungibility is to feed the neoliberal marketing of pleasure, freedom, 
and truth—of ethics. 
It thus becomes worrisome to find that the central trend of queer theory that engages 
the domain of pleasures as the radicalizing horizon for queer lives is also suspiciously ahis-
torical—namely, the infamous anti-social turn.  From the early work of Leo Bersani to the 
more recent work of Lee Edelman and Tim Dean, the move to distinguish queer pleasures 
as escaping or even undercutting the normalizing grip of the social (or the political) also 
turns out to be a distancing from the historical.61  Having constituted “the social” as ende-
mically normative, anti-social theorists argue that the exquisite and distinctive pleasure of 
sexual jouissance grants a singular access to transgressive—and hence resistant—horizons of 
experience.  For example, as an experience of pleasure that, à la Bersani, “shatters the self,” 
jouissance has been and continues to be positioned as the singular horizon of experience that 
cannot be subsumed into the heternormative, reproductive logic of the social and the poli-
tical.  But it does so precisely through the ecstatic kernel of jouissance that places it outside 
of time and place—outside of historical and social registers of meaning.  The anti-social 
turn claims its place as the quintessentially radical, resistant mode of living precisely in and 
through its ahistorical character.    
Ironically, this focus on jouissance continues to strike me as a promising mode of 
resistance to the fungibility machine of neoliberalism.  The characterization of jouissance as a 
pleasure so intense that it becomes indistinguishable from pain may well constitute a sub-
stantially different experience that resists the flattened out, hyper-stimulated, endlessly 
streaming acts of consumption that neoliberalism sells (quite successfully!) as “pleasure.” 
Jouissance cannot be maximized or intensified, tweaked or manipulated: it is not an object of 
willful choice.  As Tim Dean puts it, jouissance indicates that rare experience of pleasure that 
radically disarms the self, not the identity-confirming, self-enhancing domesticated plea-
                                                 
61 Once more, of course, the meaning of “the anti-social turn” is not the same in each of these theorists. 
For their central arguments, see Leo Bersani Homos (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Lee 
Edelman No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Tim Dean, 
Unlimited Intimacy: Reflections on the Subculture of Barebacking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
I am especially unhappy to lump Tim Dean’s work with Bersani and Edelman, not only because of his 
own critiques of them (see Tim Dean, “An Impossible Embrace: Queerness, Futurity and the Death 
Drive,” in James J. Bono, Tim Dean, and Ewa Plonowska Ziarek (eds.), A Time for Humanities: Futurity and 
the Limits of Autonomy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), but more so because of his provoca-
tive readings of the Lacanian Real that do not foreclose historicizing the social; see especially Beyond Sex-
uality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).  
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sure that saturates neoliberal cultures.62  Consequently, because jouissance resists the for-
malizing demand at the heart of the neoliberal enterprising rationality, neoliberalism must 
foreclose the possibility of such an experience taking on any social meaning.  The anti-social 
turn of queer theory is thereby correct to grasp the resistant character of this substantially 
different kind of pleasure.  The cruel irony, however, is that this branch of queer theory em-
braces jouissance precisely as neoliberalism also positions it—namely, as an experience eva-
cuated of any possible social meaning.  And in so doing, it may turn out to be one of neo-
liberalism’s best songs, subtly turning alleged social transgression into yet another site of 
entrepreneurial enterprise.  Queer theory, as anyone teaching or writing or reading it can 
quickly tell you, is a hot commodity: it continues to be quintessentially “cool.” 
I am not giving up on the possible reservoir of intervention into neoliberalism in the 
experience and concept of jouissance.  To engage it as a way to intervene in the rationality of 
fungibility, however, one must insistently and vigilantly engage it in its historicized forms.   
Even more explicitly, as an experience of sexual pleasure in cultures still deeply shaped by 
classical liberalism and its various xenophobias, we must engage it in its racialized forms.   
The history that wants to be forgotten here is the history of racism at the heart of classical 
liberalism: homonormativity also translates into homonationalism for longstanding histori-
cal reasons, as Jasbir Puar has shown.63  Thankfully, there are scholars forging these paths.  
For example, Roderick Ferguson shows how homosexual pleasure is simultaneously con-
ceptualized as both excessive and racialized in the early sociological work of the 1930s and, 
in her nuanced reading of lesbian eroticism and pleasures in South Asian films, Gayatri 
Gopinath gives a striking example of how jouissance is both racialized and threatening to a 
heteronormative social order.64  In similar veins, the work of Jacqui Alexander, Cathy Co-
hen, Ladelle McWhorter, Nayan Shah and Ethne Lubheid, among others, have all excavated 
crucial histories of the racialized character of the regulation of sexual pleasures and sex-
uality.65  If we are to continue this line of inquiry into sexuality and sexual pleasures as 
                                                 
62 See Tim Dean, “The Biopolitics of Pleasure,” South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 111, no. 13 (2012), 477-496 for 
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63 See Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke University Press: 
2007).  See also Robert Nichols’ essay in this collection for an excellent critique and extension of Puar’s 
work. 
64 See Roderick Ferguson, “Race-ing Homonormativity: Citizenship, Sociology, and Gay Identity” in 
Johnson & Henderson (eds.), Black Queer Studies: A Critical Anthology (Durham: Duke University Press, 
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Duke University Press, 2005). 
65 For an incomplete sampling of this kind of scholarship, see: Jacqui Alexander, “Imperial Desires/Sexual 
Utopias: White Gay Capital and Transnational Tourism” in Pedagogies of Crossing: Meditations on Femi-
nism, Sexual Politics, Memory, and the Sacred (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Cathy Cohen, 
“Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics” in Johnson & Hen-
derson (eds.), Black Queer Studies: A Critical Anthology (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Eithne 
Lubhéid, Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2002); Ladelle McWhorter, Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America: A Genealogy (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2009); Nayan Shah, Stranger Intimacies: Contesting Race, Sexuality and the Law in 
the North American West (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 2012).   
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exemplars of non-fungible limits to the enterprising rationality of neoliberalism, we must 
do so only in their specific historical manifestations.  And, in these neoliberal times of racia-
lized amnesia and the adamant celebration of diversity, we must do so in their specific 
racialized manifestations.  The histories of violence that attach to each of these categories of 
social difference—sexuality and race—must not circulate if the work of fungibility is to feed 
the neoliberal marketing of pleasure, freedom, and truth.  The work of queer of color cri-
tique thereby operates on at least two registers: its historicizing work resists the neoliberal 
fungibility machine, while the racializing work excavates resources to think through the 
ethical aporia of neoliberalism’s structurally damaging effects. 
Such are the warnings I derive from Foucault regarding the meanings of pleasure in 
these neoliberal times. 
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